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Is Tiger Woods Loss Averse? Persistent Bias in the
Face of Experience, Competition, and High Stakes
By Devin G. Pope and Maurice E. Schweitzer*
Although experimental studies have documented systematic decision
errors, many leading scholars believe that experience, competition,
and large stakes will reliably extinguish biases. We test for the presence of a fundamental bias, loss aversion, in a high-stakes context:
professional golfers’ performance on the PGA Tour. Golf provides a
natural setting to test for loss aversion because golfers are rewarded
for the total number of strokes they take during a tournament, yet
each individual hole has a salient reference point, par. We analyze
over 2.5 million putts using precise laser measurements and find
evidence that even the best golfers—including Tiger Woods—show
evidence of loss aversion. (JEL D03, D81, L83)
A substantial literature has identified systematic ways in which individuals violate standard economic assumptions (see Colin F. Camerer, George Loewenstein,
and Matthew Rabin 2004). This literature includes both laboratory and field studies
(for reviews, see Camerer 2000; Camerer, Loewenstein, and Rabin 2003; Stefano
DellaVigna 2009).
In spite of the extant literature documenting behavioral biases, many scholars—
including some who have documented behavioral biases—remain skeptical of the
claim that biases persist in markets (e.g., John A. List 2003, Steven D. Levitt and
List 2008, Sergiu Hart 2005).1 Critics of the decision bias literature believe that
biases are likely to be extinguished by competition, large stakes, and experience.
Levitt and List (2008) summarize their concern with the bias literature: “Perhaps
the greatest challenge facing behavioral economics is demonstrating its applicability
in the real world. In nearly every instance, the strongest empirical evidence in favor
of behavioral anomalies emerges from the lab. Yet, there are many reasons to suspect
that these laboratory findings might fail to generalize to real markets.”

* Pope: University of Chicago, 5807 Woodlawn Ave., Chicago, IL 60637 (e-mail: devin.pope@chicagobooth.
edu); Schweitzer: The Wharton School, University of Pennsylvania, 3730 Walnut Street #566, Philadelphia, PA
19104 (e-mail: Schweitzer@wharton.upenn.edu). We thank Bob Batt for excellent research support and Ken Lovell
and Mike Vitti at the PGA TOUR for help with ShotLink data access. We also thank David Abrams, Nick Barberis,
Gerard Cachon, Colin Camerer, Stefano DellaVigna, Kirk Doran, Peter Fishman, Adam Galinsky, John Hershey,
Daniel Kahneman, Bruce Kothmann, Kory Kroft, Howard Kunreuther, Rob Letzler, Steve Levitt, Cade Massey,
Arden Pope, Jaren Pope, Uri Simonsohn, Justin Sydnor, Richard Thaler, Jeremy Tobacman, Maisy Wong, Justin
Wolfers, and seminar participants at Carnegie Mellon, the Federal Trade Commission, and The Wharton School
for helpful comments and suggestions. We are also grateful to the Wharton Sports Business Initiative for generous
funding. All errors are our own.
1
Despite the fact that List has argued that behavioral biases can be mitigated by economic markets, he has been
very open to behavioral work in general (e.g., List 2002; Michael Haigh and List 2005).
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In this paper, we examine field evidence of loss aversion, a fundamental bias and
a key component of Prospect Theory (Daniel Kahneman and Amos Tversky 1979).
We consider a market with high stakes and experienced agents: The PGA Tour. The
PGA Tour brings professional golfers together to play in a series of Tournaments
each year. In each Tournament, golfers attempt to minimize the total number of
shots they take across 72 holes. We focus our attention on putts, the final shots
players take to complete a hole. We compare putts golfers attempted for par (the
typical number of shots professional golfers take to complete a hole) to putts golfers
attempted for scores different from par, such as birdie (one shot less than par). Our
sample includes more than 2.5 million putts with laser measurements of initial and
final ball placement (x, y, z coordinates). This is an ideal setting to test for loss aversion. Though golfers should care only about their overall Tournament score, golfers
may be influenced by the salient, but normatively irrelevant, reference point of par
when they attempt putts.
In contrast to the normative account, we find that golfers are significantly influenced by the reference point of par. When golfers are “under par” (e.g., shoot a
“birdie” putt that would earn them a score one stroke under par or shoot an “eagle”
putt that would earn them a score two strokes under par) they are significantly less
accurate than when they attempt otherwise similar putts for par or are “over par”
(e.g., shoot a “bogey” putt that would earn them a score one stroke over par or shoot
a “double bogey” putt that would earn them a score two strokes over par). Though
we analyze each of these types of putts, most of the putts in our data involve birdie
and par putts, and we summarize our results with respect to these putts. For example, on average, golfers make their birdie putts approximately 2 percentage points
less often than they make comparable par putts. This finding is consistent with loss
aversion; players invest more focus when putting for par to avoid encoding a loss.
Beyond controlling for distance, consider and rule out several competing explanations for this finding. First, prior to hitting a par putt, players may have learned
something about the green (by having already attempted a birdie putt). Second,
birdie putts may start from a more precarious position on the green than par putts
due to a longer approach shot. Third, player or Tournament-specific differences may
bias our results. Using detailed data, we are able to rule out competing explanations
with control methods and matching estimators. For example, we can match par and
birdie putts attempted within one inch of each other on the exact same hole in the
same Tournament. We are also able to rule out other psychological explanations. For
example, we consider whether or not players become more nervous or overconfident
when they shoot birdie putts relative to par putts.
Our finding, that golfers are less accurate when attempting birdie putts than par
putts, is moderated by Tournament round. The accuracy gap between par and birdie
putts is largest in the first round of the Tournament (first 18 holes) and is less than
half as large in the fourth round of the Tournament (last 18 holes). This finding demonstrates that the accuracy gap between par and birdie putts is neither automatic nor
immutable. Consistent with our loss aversion account, early in the Tournament, the
reference point of par is likely to be very salient; later in the Tournament, alternative reference points, such as the scores of competitors, are likely to become salient.
We also find evidence to support an additional prediction of Prospect Theory: a
risk shift. Prospect Theory predicts that economic agents will be more risk averse in
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the gain domain than they are in the loss domain. If professional golfers use par as
a reference point, they should be more cautious when putting for birdie (in the gain
domain for a specific hole) than when putting for par. Specifically, conditional on
missing a putt, we find that golfers hit birdie putts less hard than they hit par putts
and are more likely to leave birdie putts short of the hole than par putts. In graphical analysis, we demonstrate that players sacrifice success when putting for birdie
to avoid difficult follow-up putts. This pattern of results is consistent with Prospect
Theory and decreases expected profits.
Recent theoretical work has conceptualized expectations as reference points
˝ szegi and Rabin 2006). Little prior work, however, has directly tested
(Botond K o
this theory (see Vincent P. Crawford and Juanjuan Meng 2008 and Kirk Doran 2008
for exceptions). In our data, we test for endogenous reference points by considering
performance on holes in which players should expect to score either higher or lower
˝ szegi and Rabin’s (2006)
than par. Our findings provide evidence consistent with K o
prediction and suggest that expectations influence reference point adoption.
In short, our findings demonstrate that loss aversion persists in a market setting
with intense competition, large stakes, and very experienced agents. Even the best
golfers—including Tiger Woods—exhibit loss aversion.
We organize the paper in the following way: In Section I, we provide background
information about loss aversion and professional golf. In Section II, we develop a
conceptual framework to understand how loss aversion influences golf performance.
In Section III, we describe the data and present our empirical strategy. We report our
results and rule out competing explanations in Section IV, and we conclude with a
discussion of our findings and their broader implications in Section V.
I. Background on Loss Aversion and Golf

A. Prospect Theory and Loss Aversion
Rather than make consistent decisions over final wealth states, Kahneman and
Tversky (1979) postulate that economic agents evaluate decisions in isolation with
respect to a salient reference point. In Prospect Theory, Kahneman and Tversky
(1979) propose a reference-dependent theory of choice in which economic agents
value gains differently than they value losses in two key ways. First, economic
agents value losses more than they value commensurate gains (loss aversion); the
“value function” is kinked at the reference point with a steeper gradient for losses
than for gains. Second, economic agents are risk seeking in losses and risk averse
in gains (risk shift); the utility function is convex in the loss domain and concave in
the gain domain.
This model of reference dependent preferences has profound implications. If
individuals segregate related decisions, they may choose different outcomes. For
example, loss aversion and the risk shift may cause an individual to reject a series
of small gambles with positive expected return but accept the aggregated gamble.
Shlomo Benartzi and Richard H. Thaler (1995) studied this problem in the domain
of retirement saving. Benartzi and Thaler (1995) found that people who evaluated
their portfolios frequently (and made a series of related decisions) made different
hypothetical choices than did people who evaluated their portfolios infrequently.
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Daniel Read, Loewenstein, and Rabin (1999) studied the issue of segregating decisions explicitly and coined the term “narrow bracketing” to describe how individuals segregate or bracket related decisions.
Loss aversion has been documented in many laboratory settings (e.g., Thaler et
al. 1997; Uri Gneezy and Jan Potters 1997) and in several field settings (see David
Genesove and Christopher Mayer 2001; Camerer et al. 1997; Ernst Fehr and Lorenz
Goette 2007; Terrence Odean 1998, and Alex Mas 2006). Some scholars, however,
have found evidence to suggest that experience and large stakes may eliminate decision errors (List 2003, 2004).
Our paper makes an important contribution to the literature by documenting
loss aversion in a competitive field setting, with large stakes, and very experienced
agents. Our paper is also atypical in that we have an unusually large amount of statistical power and a well-defined reference point. In addition, we are able to directly
test for evidence of small-scale risk aversion and whether or not reference points
˝ szegi and Rabin 2006).
change based upon expectations (K o
B. Professional Golf
We analyze decisions made by professional golfers playing in the PGA Tour.2 The
PGA Tour is a collection of Tournaments (40–50 each year) in which professional
golfers (approximately 150 per Tournament) compete. In each Tournament, golfers
play 18 holes of golf on each of four consecutive days (four “rounds”). After the
second round, golfers with a score that places them in the bottom third are eliminated from the Tournament. All of the remaining players compete in the final two
rounds and share the total purse for the Tournament (in 2008 the average purse for
each Tournament was approximately $5 million). The distribution of payments is
highly convex; for example, the winner typically earns 18 percent of the purse.
In golf, players begin by placing a ball on a wooden tee and hitting (or “driving”)
the ball towards a hole. The players typically end each hole by putting, attempting a short shot on the well-manicured patch of grass (the “green”) near the hole.
Each player’s score is the sum total of his strokes, or hits, across all 72 holes in the
Tournament.3 The player with the lowest score wins the Tournament.
For historical reasons, each hole is assigned a value or “par.” On PGA Tour
courses, each hole has a par value equal to 3, 4, or 5. The par value represents the
number of strokes that professional golfers often require to finish a hole, and both
common golfer parlance and score cards represent performance on each hole with
respect to par. Golfers who complete a hole one or two strokes under par have shot a
“birdie” or “eagle,” respectively. Golfers who complete a hole equal to par have shot
par. Golfers who complete a hole one or two strokes over par have shot a “bogey”
or “double bogey,” respectively. On scorecards, golfers draw a circle for holes they
shot under par and a square for holes they shot over par. Scores relative to par are
2

Golf has been used as the context of several papers in economics including Ronald G. Ehrenberg and Michael
L. Bognanno (1990), Christopher Cotton and Joseph Price (2006), Jennifer Brown (2007), and Jonathan Guryan,
Kory Kroft, and Matthew J. Notowidigdo (2009).
3
This scoring method is called “stroke play” or “medal play” which is by far the most popular method of scoring in professional golf. However, other scoring systems such as “match play” do exist. Our data consists only of
Tournaments that were scored using stroke play.
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also quite salient because broadcasters and reporters will often refer to a golfer’s
score on different holes relative to par. Although it is only performance across the
72 holes that matters, we postulate that par for individual holes will serve as a salient
reference point and influence performance.
II. Conceptual Framework

We develop a simple conceptual framework to describe the influence that loss
aversion may have on putting. When golfers attempt a putt, they can either make the
putt and earn a score of Δx, or miss the putt. For simplicity, we start by assuming
that if a golfer misses his first putt, he makes his following putt and earns a score
of Δx − 1. In this framework, Δx represents the number of strokes (either positive
or negative) from par.
We consider the probability of making a putt to be a function of effort, which is
endogenously set by the golfer, and other observable putt characteristics. Specifically,
(1)

Pr (make putt) = f (e, z) + ε,

where e represents the amount of effort exerted, z represents a vector of other
putt characteristics (e.g., putt distance), and ε is random noise. We assume that
f ′ w.r.t. e ≥ 0 and f ″ w.r.t. e ≤ 0 indicating that additional effort weakly increases
the probability of making a putt and that f (*) is weakly concave in effort.
In our formulation, we consider the possibility that golfers do not consistently
deliver their maximum effort for each putt. Golfers may devote different amounts of
effort to their putts throughout the Tournament. This conceptualization is consistent
with previous work, which has found that rather than playing consistently across
every hole, golfers’ performance varies according to the incentives they face (Brown
2007; Ehrenberg and Bognanno 1990).4
For each putt, golfers derive the following utility:
(2) U = ( f (e, z) + ε) V (Δ x) + (1 − f (e, z) − ε) V (Δ x − 1) − cost(e).
Each golfer’s utility is equal to the values placed on making and missing the putt
weighted by their probabilities and subtracting the cost of effort, which we assume
to be strictly increasing (cost′(e) > 0) and convex (cost″(e) < 0).
Incorporating loss aversion (Kahneman and Tversky 1979), we represent the
value function V(∙) as
(3)

V (Δ x) =

Δ x ≥ 0  
Δ x   if
   
{ λΔx
if Δx < 0,

where λ ≥ 1 is the degree of loss aversion. This value function is a simple version
(without diminishing sensitivity in gains or losses) of the value function described
4
This is also consistent with evidence from other sports that suggests that players/teams adjust their effort levels
when psychologically discouraged (e.g., Chaim Fershtman and Gneezy 2007) or psychologically motivated (e.g.,
Jonah Berger and Pope 2009).
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Figure 1. Prospect Theory in the Domain of Golf with Par as the Reference Point

in Prospect Theory and embeds the standard model (λ = 1). Figure 1 illustrates this
value function within the domain of golf. As depicted in the figure, the difference in
value between scoring a birdie and a par on a hole is smaller than the difference in
value between scoring a par and a bogey. It is also worth noting that we define this
value function with respect to each single hole. With this formulation, we implicitly
assume that players are narrow bracketing within each hole.
Maximizing the utility function in equation (2) yields the following first-order
condition:
(4)

∂ f (e, z)
cost′(e) = _
  [V (Δ x) − V (Δ x − 1)] .
∂e

{

Combining equations (3) and (4) results in the following:
(5)

cost′(e)
_
 
 = 1
∂f(e,z)
_

if Δx ≥ 1

cost′(e)
_
 
 = λ
∂f(e,z)
_

if Δx < 1.





 
∂e

 
∂e
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These first-order conditions indicate that a golfer chooses an optimal level of effort,
e*, by setting the marginal cost of effort equal to the marginal benefit of effort when
putting for birdie or eagle (Δx ≥ 1). However, when putting for par, bogey, or
double bogey, the golfer chooses a higher optimal effort level, which equates the
ratio of the marginal cost and benefit of effort to λ.
The first-order conditions imply that players choose higher effort levels in the
loss domain (e.g., putting for par, bogey, or double bogey) than they do in the gain
domain (e.g., putting for birdie or eagle), and we combine this implication with
equation (1) to develop the following testable prediction.
PREDICTION 1: Controlling for putt characteristics, z, putts attempted for par, bogey,
and double bogey will be more accurate than putts attempted for birdie and eagle.
In equation (3), we represent a simple, linear value function (Kahneman and
Tversky 1979) that contains a loss aversion parameter. Equation (6) extends equation (3) to represent a value function with both a loss aversion parameter and separate risk preference parameters for the gain and loss domains:
(6)

V(Δ x) =

if Δ x ≥ 0
{ Δ− λ(x − Δx)     
if Δ x < 0 .
α

β

I n this value function, α and β < 1 are parameters that allow for “diminishing sensitivity.” Incremental gains in Δ x above the reference point result in progressively
smaller utility improvements. Conversely, incremental reductions in Δ x below the
reference point result in progressively smaller declines in utility. The curvature of
these lines induces players to exert less effort for a putt that is much below or much
above par. With diminishing sensitivity (as represented in equation (6)), new firstorder conditions support the following hypotheses.
PREDICTION 2: Controlling for putt characteristics, z, the probability of making
a birdie putt is greater than the probability of making an eagle putt. In addition,
controlling for putt characteristics, z, the probability of making a par putt is greater
than the probability of making a bogey putt, and the probability of making a bogey
putt is greater than the probability of making a double bogey putt.
In our conceptual framework, we assumed that if golfers miss their first putt, they
will make their following putt. This is empirically common but certainly not automatic. A golfer may miss both the initial and the second putts. We include this possibility to develop a prediction reflecting risk preferences. Compared to risk-seeking
putts, risk-averse putts are less likely to drop in the hole but are more likely to set up
easy-to-make follow-on putts.
As a result of both the loss aversion and diminishing sensitivity components of
Prospect Theory (Kahneman and Tversky 1979), golfers in the domain of gains
(golfers attempting eagle or bogey putts) will be more likely to choose risk averse
putts than golfers in the domain of losses (golfers attempting par, bogey, or double
bogey putts). This leads to our final prediction:
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PREDICTION 3: Controlling for putt characteristics, z, players will be more risk
averse when putting for birdie and eagle than when putting for par, bogey, or double
bogey.
In the results section, we discuss how we measure risk aversion in the context of golf
in order to test Prediction 3.
III. Data and Empirical Strategy

To test our predictions, we need to control for putt characteristics, z. This requires
access to a rich dataset, which we obtained from the PGA Tour. Since 2002, the PGA
Tour has employed approximately 250 workers to gather information each week. Of
particular relevance to our investigation, the PGA Tour mounts lasers around each hole
of a course to measure every shot each player attempts. These laser measurements
record with great precision (within less than one inch) the x, y, and z coordinates of
the resting position of each ball after every shot. The PGA Tour collected these data
to provide information for print journalism, broadcasting, instant online updates, and
basic statistics. These data, however, also enable us to test our predictions.
In our analyses, we include data from 239 Tournaments completed between 2004
and 2009. We focus on putts, and we restrict our dataset to putts attempted for eagle,
birdie, par, bogey, or double bogey.5 Due to computational constraints, we restrict
the data to players for whom we have at least 1,000 putts, leaving us with 2,525,161
putts attempted by 421 professional golfers.6 In Table 1, we report summary statistics. Most of the putts in our data were for either par (47.0 percent) or birdie (39.8
percent). As a result, a large portion of our identification will contrast par and birdie
putts.
To test predictions 1 and 2, we compare the probability of making putts with
different values relative to par (e.g., bogey, par, birdie, or eagle) that are otherwise
similar. Our main specifications take the following form:
(7)

Make Puttijk = αj + δk + β (Value Relative to Parijk) + γ Zijk + εijk .

The indicator Make Puttijkfor each putt i, player j, and specific hole (in a given round
and Tournament) k is represented as a linear function with player and hole fixed effects,
a vector of dummy variables indicating the value relative to par (e.g., birdie), a vector
of control variables (e.g., distance to the hole), and a random error term.
Our controls in equation (7) enable us to compare otherwise similar putts. For
example, we compare birdie and par putts attempted from the same distance to
the hole. It is important, however, to note why variation in shot values exists after
controlling for distance and other factors. For example, par and birdie putts may
5
2,549 observations (<0.01 percent of data) were deleted due to odd data values (e.g., putts attempted more than
1,000 inches from the hole).
6
Many players played in only one or two Tournaments during our sample period. Since we are running regressions with player fixed effects (as well as hole fixed effects), each player adds to the computational difficulty. Using
the entire sample results in regressions that will not run due to space constraints or take weeks to finish. By eliminating players who have few observations, we dramatically reduce the computational demands while eliminating only
a small fraction of the total observations.
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Table 1—Summary Statistics
Average distance to the hole (inches)
Fraction of putts for par
Fraction of putts for birdie
Fraction of putts for eagle
Fraction of putts for bogey
Fraction of putts for double bogey
Observations

Made putts

Missed putts

Full sample

50.8
63.9
18.5
0.3
15.1
2.1
1,538,198

269.4
20.6
73.1
3.0
2.4
1.0
986,963

136.3
47.0
39.8
1.3
10.2
1.7
2,525,161

Note: This table provides summary statistics for putts taken in the PGA Tour between 2004
and 2009.

be attempted from the same distance on a particular hole. The differences in shot
value reflect the accuracy and distance with which prior shots were hit on that hole
(e.g., a well-hit versus a badly hit tee shot). After controlling for player and hole
fixed effects, we argue that these prior-to-the-putt differences are based on idiosyncratic factors that are unrelated to the putt itself.7
IV. Results

A. Main Effects
Predictably, distance is a key determinant of putt success. As we plot in Figure
2, the probability of making par and birdie putts declines with distance to the hole.
More interestingly, we document a consistent difference between par and birdie putt
success. For a given distance, golfers are approximately 2–4 percentage points more
likely to make par putts than they are to make birdie putts.
Consistent with Figure 2 and supporting Prediction 1, we report results from logit
regression analyses in Table 2 that demonstrate that birdie and eagle putts are less
accurate than par, bogey, and double bogey putts. Controlling for distance (Table 2,
column 1), putts attempted for birdie or eagle are 2.0 percentage points less likely to
be made than putts attempted for par, bogey, or double bogey. This value is statistically significant and has a high degree of precision (t = 43.2).
In this regression and across all of our regressions, we include a seventh-order
polynomial for distance to the hole. Goodness-of-fit tests suggest that a seventhorder polynomial is necessary and sufficient to control for this important variable.
In column 2 of Table 2, we report results from a logit regression that includes
indicator variables for each putt type (e.g., putt for birdie, eagle, bogey, and double
bogey). Par serves as the omitted category. Results from this regression suggest
that eagle putts are the least likely to be made, followed by birdie putts. These findings are consistent with our second prediction and suggest diminishing sensitivity.

7
In our analyses, we consider the possibility that the quality of earlier shots may influence putt attempts. For
example, a golfer may be “having a good day” and thus a good tee shot may be followed by a good putt. Importantly,
it is worth noting that this type of positive autocorrelation between shots runs counter to the predictions we make.
We consider this and other alternative accounts later in our analyses.
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Figure 2
Notes: This figure depicts the fraction of successful par and birdie putts by distance to the hole (in inches). The
sample includes 2,525,161 putts attempted in the PGA Tour between 2004 and 2008.
Table 2—The Effect of Different Shot Values on Putt Success

Putt for birdie or eagle
Putt for eagle

Dependent variable equals 1 if putt was made
Logit estimation
(1)
(2)
−0.020***
(0.001)

Putt for birdie
Putt for bogey
Putt for double bogey
Putt distance: 7th-order polynomial
Pseudo R2
Observations

X
0.550
2,525,161

−0.024***
(0.002)
−0.019***
(0.001)
0.009***
(0.001)
−0.006***
(0.002)
X
0.550
2,525,161

Notes: This table reports marginal effects and robust standard errors for the differential success rate of putts of different shot values (par, birdie, etc.) from a logit regression. Column 1
compares putts taken for birdie and eagle relative to the omitted category—putts taken for par,
bogey, and double bogey. Column 2 compares each shot value separately relative to the omitted catergory, par.
*** Significant at the 1 percent level.
** Significant at the 5 percent level.

Bogey putts are more likely to be made than par putts, and double bogey putts are
slightly less likely to be made than par putts. The coefficient for double bogey putts
is consistent with diminishing sensitivity, but the coefficient for bogey putts is not.
We revisit this result in the robustness section.
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Table 3—The Effect of Different Shot Values on Putt Success–Robustness Checks

Putt for eagle
Putt for birdie
Putt for bogey

(1)

−0.040***
(0.002)
−0.036***
(0.001)
0.004***
(0.001)
−0.007***
(0.002)
X

(2)

−0.039***
(0.002)
−0.036***
(0.001)
0.005***
(0.001)
−0.006***
(0.001)
X

Dependent variable equals 1 if putt was made
(OLS estimation)
(3)
(4)
(5)
(6)
−0.030***
(0.002)
−0.026***
(0.001)
0.001
(0.001)
−0.005**
(0.002)
X

−0.042***
(0.002)
−0.029***
(0.001)
0.003***
(0.001)
−0.003
(0.002)
X

−0.039***
(0.002)
−0.028***
(0.001)
0.002***
(0.001)
−0.003
(0.002)
X

−0.036***
(0.002)
−0.028***
(0.001)
0.002***
(0.001)
−0.003
(0.002)
X

(7)

−0.036***
(0.003)
−0.028***
(0.001)
0.002***
(0.001)
−0.002
(0.002)
X

(8)

−0.064***
(0.003)
−0.030***
(0.001)
0.006***
(0.001)
0.001
(0.002)
X

Putt for double
bogey
Putt distance:
seventh-order
polynomial
Player fixed effects
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
Previous-putts-onX
X
X
X
X
X
green effects
Tournament-roundX
hole effects
4 hole-location
X
effects
8 hole-location
X
effects
16 hole-location
X
effects
Score-on-hole-ifX
make-putt effects
R2
0.598
0.598
0.599
0.603
0.612
0.626
0.646
0.670
Observations
2,525,161 2,525,161 2,525,161 2,525,161 2,525,161 2,525,161 2,525,161 2,525,161

Notes: This table reports estimates and robust standard errors for the differential success rate of putts of different shot values (par, birdie, etc.) using OLS. Increasingly precise controls are included in each column including:
player fixed effects, dummy variables for the number of putts previously attempted on the green by the golfer and
the other golfer in a player’s group, fixed effects for each hole in a given round and tournament, fixed effects for
4, 8, and 16 location areas for each hole, and fixed effects for the score if the putt is successful for every hole in a
given round and tournament.
*** Significant at the 1 percent level.
** Significant at the 5 percent level.

B. Alternative Classical Explanations
Though our findings are consistent with loss aversion, we consider a number of
alternative explanations. In our next set of analyses, we use a Linear Probability
Model rather than the more computational intensive Logit Model, because we
include a large number of fixed effects. In our most detailed specification, we include
more than 300,000 fixed effects.
To provide a point of comparison, in column 1 in Table 3 we report a simple specification including different putt types and the seventh-order distance polynomial.
Reflecting differences between OLS and logit, the estimates in this regression are
slightly larger than those in Table 2. Still, the basic findings remain.
Differences in Player Ability.—We first consider player fixed effects. Some players may be good drivers (hitting long shots from the tee to the green) but bad putters,
and others may be bad drivers but good putters. If this were true, player differences
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could account for our finding that birdie putts are less accurate than par putts. To
address this question, we include player fixed effects, and we report results from
this regression in column 2 of Table 3. We find no significant change in our findings.
Still, we include player fixed effects in all future specifications.
Learning.—Alternatively, players may learn about the condition of the green from
earlier putts. After putting once, golfers may learn important information about the
slope or conditions on the green. Compared to birdie putts, par putts are more likely
to be the second putt attempted by a golfer on the green. As a result, par putts may be
more accurate than birdie putts, because golfers have learned important information.
In fact, it is possible that players may learn important information from watching
their partners putt on the green.
To control for learning effects, we include separate dummy variables for the
number of putts already attempted on the green by the player and the player’s
partner.8 The results from this specification suggest that learning is important. As
we report in column 3 of Table 3, golfers are significantly more likely to make the
second and third putts on the green than they are to make otherwise similar first
putts on the green.9
By including controls for prior putts on the green, the point estimates for birdie
and eagle putts are reduced by 20 to 30 percent. However, the remaining differences
attributed to birdie or eagle putts relative to par putts remains highly significant. In
all future specifications, we include these controls.
Throughout our analysis, we assume that players do not learn about the green
prior to actually putting on the green (at which point we include controls). However,
it is possible that players learn by watching their approach shots land and roll on the
green. Given that par putts are more likely to have a shorter approach shot than birdie
putts, learning from closer approach shots could bias our results. Unfortunately, we
are unable to control for the entire dynamic process that leads to a putt because this
process itself is what generates our variation. For example, on par 3 holes there
is very little variation in par versus birdie putt attempts that had similar approach
shots. However, we can observe variation on par 5 holes and some par 4 holes. We
restrict our sample to par and birdie putt attempts with very long approach shots
(more than 50 or more than 100 yards) where learning about the green is unlikely.
In separate regressions, we also include a high-degree polynomial of the distance
of the approach shot. Although the point estimates are smaller (0.6–0.8 percent for
the birdie coefficient and 0.8–1.0 percent for the eagle coefficient), we continue
to find highly significant differences between par, birdie, and eagle success when
we include these controls.10 These smaller point estimates could reflect learning
from approach shots, increased noise due to the lack of variation in the data, or
8
Alternatively, one could restrict the sample of putts to those which are first putts attempted on the green.
Performing this analysis yields a coefficient on the birdie dummy nearly identical to the coefficient when simply
including dummy variables for the number of own and other shots already taken on the green.
9
We attribute this effect to learning. However, an alternative psychological phenomenon may be driving this
reduction. Golfers may have an aversion to taking three putts to finish a hole. If this were true, golfers may try very
hard after missing a putt to avoid a “three putt.” Alternatively, golfers may update their reference point once they
arrive on the green. This may cause golfers to work harder on a second putt since missing the second putt may be
coded as a loss. We are unable to disentangle these accounts from learning about the green.
10
We also continue to find moderation effects by round and that golfers lay the ball up short on birdie putts.
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˝ szegi and Rabin (2006). K o
˝ szegi and
differences in expectations consistent with K o
Rabin’s account suggests that when players expect to perform better, the par-birdie
differential should be smaller. In Section IVF, we consider and test this possibility.
˝ szegiAs we discuss at the end of the paper, this finding is consistent with the K o
Rabin prediction that the par-birdie differential should be smaller in situations where
players expect to perform better (par 5 holes).
Differences across Holes.—We next consider fixed effects for specific holes. It is
possible, for example, that holes with easy fairways have difficult greens and that
holes with difficult fairways have easy greens. If this were true, birdie putts may be
more common than par putts on holes with difficult greens.
To account for this possibility, we include fixed effects for each of the 17,096 different holes (for a given round and Tournament).11 We report results from this regression
in column 4 of Table 3. By including these fixed effects, our results actually become
stronger suggesting that holes with easy fairways may also have easy greens.
Position on the Green.—Although we account for distance, it is possible that birdie
putts start from a more precarious position on the green than equally distanced par
putts. For example, approach shots to the green may be shorter for par putts than
they are for birdie putts, and as a result, players putting for par may be able to avoid
difficult spots on the green (e.g., sections of the green with awkward slopes).
The level of detail in our dataset enables us to address this concern. We use the x,
y, z coordinates to control for putts taken from different positions on the green. To
do this, we first divide the area around each hole in each round in each Tournament
into four quadrants or “pie pieces.” We characterize each putt attempt by quadrant,
and we report regression results with dummy variable controls for each quadranthole-round-Tournament in column 5 of Table 3. These fixed effects control for location-specific differences.
We conduct even more precise analyses with finer divisions of the space around
the hole. In column 6 of Table 3, we report regression results that include controls
for eight “pie pieces” (from dividing the green around each hole into eight sections).
In column 7 of Table 3, we report regression results that include controls for
16 sections that not only cut the green into eight pie pieces but also include a concentric circle of radius 137 inches (the mean putt distance in the data).
From these analyses, we find that certain areas of each green are harder to putt
from than other areas. By including location-specific effects, we gain predictive
power; the R2 in the regressions rises from 0.603 (with no location-specific effects)
to 0.646 (16 location-specific effects per hole).12
More importantly, we find only small declines in point estimates as we control for
location-specific effects. Location-specific differences influence overall accuracy,
but they cannot account for the differences we observe across putt types.

11
Locations of the hole on each green are typically changed in every round during a Tournament. For this reason,
fixed effects for every hole in each round in a Tournament must be included rather than just a fixed effect of each
hole in a four-round Tournament.
12
Adjusted R2 values increase by a more modest amount (0.599 to 0.608).
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Position in the Tournament.—We next control for each golfer’s standing in the
Tournament. When golfers attempt birdie or par putts, they may exert different
amounts of effort depending upon their standing in the Tournament. For example, it
is possible that golfers may be more likely to attempt birdie putts when they are far
behind and are exerting less effort.
To account for the possibility that player scores influence our finding, we control
for each golfer’s score in the Tournament when attempting each putt. We include
dummy variables that represent a combination of the hole that a golfer is on and
his overall Tournament score if he makes the putt.13 For example, imagine that one
golfer attempts a par putt on the second hole of the first round of a Tournament and
a second golfer attempts a birdie putt on the same second hole. Imagine further that
the first golfer attempting the par putt has a score of −1 from the first hole (indicating that he shot a birdie on the first hole), and the second golfer attempting the birdie
putt has a score of 0 going from the first hole (indicating that he shot par on the
first hole). These two golfers would both have a fixed effect indicating that if they
made their current putts, they would both earn a score of −1 (after two holes). This
example illustrates how these fixed effects partition each putt into a bucket of putts
that, if made, will place the golfers in the same scoring position in the Tournament.
We report results from this analysis in column 8 in Table 3. We find that our
main result is not affected by these additional controls. Even accounting for golfers’ score, golfers make birdie putts 3.0 percentage points less often than otherwise
similar par putts.
Matching Model.—In addition to conducting parametric analyses with control
variables, we conduct nonparametric analyses to test alternative explanations that
might account for our findings. Though we lose some statistical power with this
approach, we are able to compare par and birdie putts in novel ways.
First, we consider a matching model to compare par and birdie putts taken from
the same spot on a particular hole, in a particular round, in a particular Tournament.
We begin by creating a list of every par putt in our dataset. We then use a matching
algorithm to identify the birdie putt on the same hole-round-Tournament with the
shortest linear distance from each par putt. For some holes, there are no birdie putts
attempted from a position near a par putt. However, on many holes a birdie and a par
putt were attempted from nearly the exact same x, y, and z coordinate.
We report results from our matched par-birdie analyses in Table 4. In column 1,
we report results from the 2,828 pairs of par and birdie putts that were attempted
within one inch of each other. Consistent with our thesis and our parametric results,
from the same position on the green golfers made their par putts significantly more
often than they made their birdie putts (88.0 percent of the time versus 83.5 percent
of the time, p < 0.001).
In columns 2–8 we report results from pairs of par and birdie putts that were
attempted within two, three, four, five, eight, 12, and 24 inches of each other. With
13
One might imagine other ways to control for a golfer’s position in the Tournament (e.g., strokes behind the
current leader). The problem, however, with many of these alternatives is that golfers play at different times of the
day, and thus a golfer may have the best score at a particular moment in time, but it is simply because other golfers
have not yet started the course.
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Table 4—Estimates from Matching Par and Birdie Putts
< 1 inch
(1)
Fraction of matched
birdie putts made
Fraction of matched
par putts made
Average distance of
matched birdie putts
Average distance of
matched par putts
Number of pairs

Maximum distance between matched par and birdie putts
< 2 inches < 3 inches < 4 inches < 5 inches < 8 inches < 12 inches < 24 inches
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
(6)
(7)
(8)

0.835
(0.010)

0.878
(0.005)

0.895
(0.003)

0.897
(0.002)

0.895
(0.002)

0.881
(0.001)

0.861
(0.001)

0.812
(0.001)

49.50

39.67

36.81

36.76

36.98

39.63

43.69

53.63

49.50

39.67

36.77

36.70

36.87

39.35

43.11

51.81

2,828

9,547

20,019

33,239

48,136

97,281

162,418

329,793

0.880
(0.009)

0.905
(0.004)

0.914
(0.003)

0.912
(0.002)

0.910
(0.002)

0.900
(0.001)

0.882
(0.001)

0.843
(0.001)

Notes: For every par putt in the data, a birdie putt taken on the same hole, in the same round, in the same tournament is matched to the par putt if the distance between the par and birdie putt is less than the indicated amount in
the table. We report distances from less than 1 inch to less than 24 inches in columns 1–8. We report the fractions of
matched par and birdie putts that were made along with standard errors. We also report the average distance of the
matched par and birdie putts for each distance cutoff.

larger distances, we increase the number of matched pairs, but of course, these
matches are less precise. Across these analyses, we find that golfers made their par
putts between 1.5 percent and 3.1 percent more often than they made their birdie
putts.
The effect sizes of these results are smaller than some of the effect sizes we reported
in the parametric analyses (e.g., 3.6 percent in column 1 of Table 3). However, this
difference stems from the nature of the putts in our matched sample. Most of the
putts in our matched sample are putts very close to the hole (the average putt length
for putts in columns 1–8 in Table 4 is only 35–50 inches). Golfers almost always
make very short putts, and the difference between the probability of making par
and birdie putts for very short putts is small. Thus, while the effect sizes may seem
slightly smaller, if we account for the proximity of the putts they actually are not.
We illustrate this in the Web Appendix by running analyses similar to Table 3 using
the matched data sample. Overall, the results from the matching estimation suggest
that our findings are robust to nonparametric controls of distance and green location.
C. Alternative Psychological Explanations
Psychological factors can influence putt accuracy (Sian Beilock et al. 2001;
Beilock et al. 2004), and in this section we consider two psychological phenomena
that might account for our findings: overconfidence and nervousness.
Overconfidence.—Overconfidence can harm performance in a number of domains.
For example, overconfidence harms judgment accuracy (Sarah Lichtenstein, Baruch
Fischhoff, and Lawrence Phillips 1982; Asher Koriat, Lichtenstein, and Fischhoff
1980), forecast accuracy (Robert Vallone et al. 1990) and investment decisions
(Brad M. Barber and Odean 2001). We consider overconfidence as a possible explanation for our findings.
After hitting a well-placed shot, golfers may become overconfident or cocky in a
way that harms their performance on their next shot. By construction, birdie putts
are more likely to follow well-hit drives than par putts. Therefore, overconfidence
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might account for our finding that golfers exhibit negative autocorrelation (after hitting a good shot, their next shot is likely to be bad).
We test this account by searching for negative autocorrelation in performance.
Using methods similar to those used by Cotton and Price (2006), we compare performance across holes. Consistent with Cotton and Price’s (2006) results, rather
than finding negative autocorrelation, we find positive autocorrelation; when golfers
score one stroke less on a hole relative to average performance on a hole, they are
likely to score 0.004 (p < 0.01) fewer strokes than average performance on the next
hole.14 That is, absent a story of loss aversion, our best evidence suggests positive
autocorrelation across shots; overconfidence or cockiness cannot account for our
findings.
In addition, overconfidence is inconsistent with the set of ancillary results we
report later in the paper. For example, prior research demonstrates that overconfidence promotes aggressive behavior (Camerer and Dan Lovallo 1999). We find that
golfers actually hit birdie putts less hard than they hit similar par putts.
Nervousness.—The second psychological account we consider is nervousness.
Golfers on the PGA Tour hit putts that have large financial consequences, and prior
work has found that people often feel nervous or anxious when they face high stakes
(Julie McCarthy and Richard Goffin 2004; Beilock 2008; Dan Ariely et al. 2009).
Feelings of nervousness harm performance by disrupting task-focused thinking
(Irwin Sarason 1984) and by motivating people to make expedient choices to exit
their current situation (Alison Wood and Schweitzer 2010).
If golfers value making a birdie putt more than they value making a par putt, they
might get nervous and “choke” when putting for birdie. Similarly, golfers may get
nervous when taking a birdie putt because a successful birdie putt may advance a
golfer into a better position in the Tournament.
The nervousness account, however, cannot explain our results. First, although
amateur golfers may infrequently take birdie putts, professional golfers attempt
nearly as many birdie putts as they do par putts. Second, even when successful
birdie and par putts both would place golfers in a similar position, golfers are still
more likely to make par putts than birdie putts. As we report in column 8 of Table 3,
golfers’ relative putt accuracy is unaffected by golfers’ scores.
The nervousness account is also inconsistent with three aspects of our ancillary
results. First, as we demonstrate in the following section, players hit their birdie
putts shorter than they hit otherwise similar par putts. Second, we demonstrate that
even the best golfers including Tiger Woods exhibit this bias in early rounds of
Tournaments. Third, the difference between par and birdie putts diminishes across
rounds. Nervousness cannot explain these findings.
Finally, though perhaps least persuasive, we offer anecdotal evidence. Consistent
with our thesis, and contradicting the nervousness account, several golfers have
stated that they actually value par putts more than they value birdie putts. For
example, after playing a round in 2007, Tiger Woods explained, “Any time you
14
We find consistent results using different methods (e.g., with and without player-specific controls and alternative nonparametric methods that correct for problems that arise when using fixed effects and lagged dependent
variables).
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Table 5—The Effect of Different Shot Values on Putt Success–By Round
Dependent variable equals 1 if putt was made
(OLS estimation)
Full sample
4-round players only
Round 1
Putt for eagle
Putt for birdie
Putt for bogey
Putt for double bogey
Putt distance: seventh-order
polynomial
Player fixed effects
Previous-putts-on-green
effects
Tournament-round-hole effects
R2
Observations

Round 2

Round 3

Round 4

Round 1

Round 2

Round 3

Round 4

−0.053*** −0.044*** −0.028*** −0.031***
(0.004)
(0.004)
(0.005)
(0.004)

−0.065*** −0.057*** −0.028*** −0.031***
(0.005)
(0.005)
(0.005)
(0.004)

0.003*** 0.003*** 0.004*** 0.003**
(0.001)
(0.001)
(0.002)
(0.002)

0.003*** 0.006*** 0.004*** 0.003**
(0.001)
(0.001)
(0.001)
(0.001)

−0.038*** −0.028*** −0.024*** −0.021***
(0.001)
(0.001)
(0.002)
(0.002)
−0.003
(0.003)

−0.004
(0.003)

X

X

0.001
(0.004)
X

−0.001
(0.004)
X

−0.046*** −0.035*** −0.024*** −0.021***
(0.002)
(0.002)
(0.002)
(0.002)
−0.003
(0.003)
X

0.002
(0.003)
X

−0.004
(0.003)
X

−0.001
(0.003)
X

X
X

X
X

X
X

X
X

X
X

X
X

X
X

X
X

X
0.599
791,112

X
0.598
773,476

X
0.610
477,732

X
0.611
469,140

X
0.592
440,824

X
0.599
440,171

X
0.610
477,732

X
0.611
469,140

Notes: This table reports estimates and robust standard errors for the differential success rate of putts of different shot values (par, birdie, etc.) using OLS while controlling for several baseline covariates. The coefficients are
reported when cutting the data by round. Columns 1–4 indicate coefficients for rounds 1–4, respectively, when using
all putts attempted in all rounds. Columns 5–8 indicate coefficients for rounds 1–4, respectively, when restricting
the sample to putts taken by players that played all four rounds of the tournament. This data restriction adjusts for
the sample attrition that takes place in golf tournaments after the second round.
*** Significant at the 1 percent level.
** Significant at the 5 percent level.

make big par putts, I think it’s more important to make those than birdie putts. You
don’t ever want to drop a shot. The psychological difference between dropping a
shot and making a birdie, I just think it’s bigger to make a par putt.”
D. Differences across Rounds
The difference in accuracy between par and birdie putts is remarkably robust
across a range of parameters including players, position on the green, and players’
scores. However, we find that the difference in accuracy between par and birdie
putts diminishes considerably, but does not disappear, across rounds.
As we report in Table 5 in columns 1–4, the difference in accuracy between par
and birdie putts diminishes monotonically from 3.8 percent in Round 1 to 2.1 percent in Round 4 (p < 0.001). We find a similar pattern for the discrepancy between
the accuracy of par and eagle putts.
Of course, a selection effect could contribute to the round effect that we observe.
A third of players do not advance to rounds 3 and 4, and if these players exhibit bias
in rounds 1 and 2, the differences we observe in early and later rounds could reflect
differences in the population rather than an effect of round.
To address this concern, we conduct the same analyses but include only participants who completed all four rounds of the Tournament. The round effect remains.
As before, the par-birdie discrepancy in accuracy diminishes by half between the
first and the fourth round.
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The finding that the round of play moderates our effect is interesting for two
reasons. First, this finding demonstrates that the discrepancy in accuracy between
birdie and par putts is not automatic and argues against alternative accounts. For
example, none of the following alternative explanations can account for why the
discrepancy would diminish across rounds: birdie putts are more difficult than par
putts because they start from a more precarious position on the green, birdie putts
are more difficult than par putts because they follow a longer approach shot, or
birdie putts are more difficult than par putts because players learn more information
prior to taking a par shot.
Second, the finding that the round of play moderates our effect is interesting
because it is consistent with our reference point story. In the first round, the reference point of par is likely to be very salient for golfers. By the fourth round,
however, other reference points such as the scores of other golfers are likely to be
more salient. These competing reference points are likely to diminish the influence
of par on performance. In fact, some golfers colloquially refer to Round 3 of PGA
Tournaments (typically Saturday) as “moving day.” After a third of the players have
been cut, golfers may shift their focus to their peer’s performance as they try to
change their rank or “move.”
E. Differences in Risk Aversion
According to Prospect Theory, economic agents are risk averse in the domain of
gains and risk seeking in the domain of losses. If golfers narrowly bracket on individual holes and adopt par as their reference point, we would expect golfers to be
more risk averse when hitting birdie and eagle putts than they are when they hit par,
bogey, and double bogey putts.
When putting, golfers balance two objectives. One objective is to hit the ball into
the hole. The second objective is to limit the difficulty of a follow-on shot should
they miss their putt. On average, conditional on missing the putt, golfers hit the ball
15–25 inches past the hole. Risk averse putts are putts that are hit short. Risk averse
putts sacrifice the likelihood of hitting the ball into the hole to limit the difficulty of
a follow-on shot. Within our framework, we expect birdie and eagle putts to be hit
less hard than par, bogey, and double bogey putts.
Consistent with our thesis, conditional on missing the putt, golfers hit birdie and
eagle putts significantly less hard than they hit par, bogey, and double bogey putts.
We report results from OLS regressions in Table 6 in columns 1 and 2. These regressions include missed putts and predict the probability of leaving a putt short of the
hole as a function of the type of putt attempted. Eagle putts, on average, are hit 0.80
inches less hard than equally distanced par putts, and birdie putts are hit 0.19 inches
less hard than par putts. Surprisingly, bogey and double bogey putts are also hit
softer than par putts, although there are very few missed bogey and double bogey
putts. In this analysis, the standard errors of these estimates are very large.
In Table 6 in column 2, we also report the probability that the ball will be hit short
of the hole. Consistent with our thesis, eagle and birdie putts are both significantly
more likely to be hit short of the hole than par putts. In Table 6 in columns 3 and 4,
we provide similar results to those we report in columns 1 and 2, but we restrict the
sample to putts longer than 270 inches (the average putt distance for missed putts).
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Table 6—The Effect of Different Shot Values on Risk Aversion

All missed
putts
Putt length
Left short
(1)
(2)
Putt for eagle
Putt for birdie
Putt for bogey
Putt for double bogey
Putt distance: seventh-order
polynomial
Player fixed effects
Previous-putts-on-green effects
Tournament-round-hole effects
R2
Observations

Ordinary least squares
Missed putts longer
than 270 inches
Putt length
Left short
(3)
(4)

All missed
putts
Make next putt
(5)

−0.80**
(0.32)
−0.19**
(0.08)
−0.365
(0.19)
−0.053
(0.29)
X

0.013***
(0.003)
0.003***
(0.001)
0.007***
(0.003)
0.008
(0.004)
X

−2.44***
(0.56)
−1.59***
(0.27)
0.65
(0.72)
0.41
(0.95)
X

0.032***
(0.006)
0.019***
(0.003)
0.000
(0.008)

−0.001
(0.011)
X

−0.003
(0.002)
0.001**
(0.001)
−0.003
(0.001)

X
X
X
0.968
986,963

X
X
X
0.169
986,963

X
X
X
0.918
406,942

X
X
X
0.127
406,942

X
X
X
0.095
977,500

−
−
X

Notes: This table reports estimates and robust standard errors for the differential success rate of putts of different
shot values (par, birdie, etc.) using OLS. Columns 1 and 2 report the estimates of shot value on putt length and laying up short of the hole using all missed putts in the data. Columns 3 and 4 provide similar estimates but for putts
attempted at a distance of more than 270 inches (the average distance of a missed putt). Column 5 reports the impact
of shot value on the probability of making the next putt (conditional on missing the current putt).
*** Significant at the 1 percent level.
** Significant at the 5 percent level.

These estimates, which are larger than those found in columns 1 and 2, suggest that
the effects are strongest for long putts.15
In Figure 3, we depict where missed par and birdie putts stop on the green with
respect to the hole. We normalize each putt as if it were lined up with the hole
from the left side of the x-axis. We divide the green around the hole into a series of
12 inch × 12 inch boxes. We then run separate OLS regressions for each box. The
dependent variable is a binary outcome equal to one if the missed putt stopped in the
box. The numbers represented in each box are the coefficient of birdie putts from
these regressions. Positive numbers indicate that birdie putts are more likely to stop
in the box than par putts. Negative numbers indicate that par putts are more likely to
stop in the box than birdie putts.
In Figure 3, the positive numbers in front of the hole illustrate that birdie putts
are more likely to stop in front of the hole, and that par putts are more likely to stop
behind the hole. We report similar analyses in Figure 3, panel B. In this figure, we
restrict the sample to missed putts attempted from more than 270 inches (the average distance of a missed putt). As before, this figure demonstrates that birdie putts
are hit less hard than par putts.
Is risk aversion helpful? Birdie putts are hit less hard than par putts. Though birdie
putts are less likely than par putts to land in the hole, softer hits make the follow-on
shots after missed birdie putts easier than follow-on shots after missed par putts.
15

For very short putts, putts less than 200 inches, we find no differences. Notably, the risk aversion account
cannot explain the entire par-birdie accuracy gap.
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Panel A. All missed putts
–4

–3

–2

–1

Feet from hole
0

1

2

3

4

0.000

0.000

0.000

0.000

0.000

0.000

0.000

0.000

0.000

0.000

0.000

0.000

0.000

0.000

0.000

0.000

0.001

0.001

0.002

0.002

0.000

0.000

0.000

0.000

0.002

0.005

0.007

–0.004 –0.005

–0.001

0.001

0.001

0.002

0.005

0.007

–0.004 –0.006

–0.003

0.001

0.000

0.001

0.001

0.002

0.002

0.001

0.000

0.000

0.000

0.000

0.000

0.000

0.000

0.000

0.000

0.000

0.000

0.000

0.000

0.000

0.000

0.000

0.000

0.000

4
3
2
1
0
1

Feet from hole

0.000

2
3
4

Panel B. Missed putts taken from more than 270 inches
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Figure 3
Notes: This figure provides a graphical illustration of where each missed putt (Figure 3a) and each missed putt taken
from more than 220 inches away, a distance greater than the average missed putt length (Figure 3b) came to a rest.
Each putt is oriented so as to be taken from the left side of the x axis and the hole at the origin. We conducted a separate regression (with controls) for each 12 inch × 12 inch box with a dummy dependent variable indicating whether
the missed putt came to rest in the box. The number in each box is the coefficient on a birdie putt indicator. Positive
(negative) coefficients indicate that birdie putts are more (less) likely to come to rest in the box than par putts.

In Table 4 in column 5, we report results predicting whether or not the follow-on
shot landed in the hole conditional on missing the current putt. Results from this
analysis indicate that the softer birdie putts do indeed improve the probability of
making a follow-up shot. However, the size of this effect (0.1 percent) is only marginally significant and is overwhelmed by the decreased probability of making the
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initial putt. That is, the increased probability of making a follow-up shot by hitting
a birdie putt softly does not come close to compensating for the loss of accuracy in
hitting birdie putts.16
This finding is consistent with other analyses not reported, such as analyses estimating the total number of strokes required to finish the hole following a par or
birdie putt. The results are nearly identical when looking at total future strokes,
because the advantage to laying it up short is overwhelmed by the decrease in accuracy of the original putt.
While golfers are more risk averse when putting for birdie, this aversion cannot
explain the entire difference in putt success between birdie and par putts that we
find. Birdie putts are more likely to be laid up short of the hole, but they also are
significantly more likely to miss the hole to the left or right.17 Because of these leftright mistakes, the distance of follow-up shots from missed birdie putts is similar to
the distance from missed par putts. Thus, birdie putts are missed more often due to
both risk aversion as well as left-right mistakes.
˝ szegi-Rabin Reference Points
F. K o
In our conceptual framework and in our analyses, we have assumed that golfers
making reference dependent choices adopt par as their point of reference. In recent
˝ szegi and Rabin (2006) suggest that rational expectations might
theoretical work, K o
serve as the point of reference for reference-dependent choices. A recent empirical
study supports this idea. Crawford and Meng (2008) found that by allowing rational
expectations to inform reference points for hours worked and income earned, they
were able to fit a model of cabdrivers’ labor supply decisions with greater accuracy
(Camerer et al. 1997; Henry S. Farber 2005). Farber (2008) and Doran (2008) also
study cabdriver labor supply and also make significant contributions to understanding reference point adaptation. Farber (2008) allows reference points to be different
across people but treats the income reference points as latent variables (as opposed
to assigning reference points based on rational expectations). Doran (2008) finds
that cabdrivers who display reference-dependent preferences did not change their
hours worked following an exogenous permanent wage increase. This finding is
˝ szegi-Rabin’s (2006) model of reference point adaptation.
consistent with K o
Although par is likely to be a salient reference point, professional golfers may
develop expectations for their performance that are different from par. For example,
on an easy par-five hole an expert golfer may expect to complete the hole with four
shots. In this case, four (rather than five) shots may serve as the reference point.
We consider a rational expectations approach for reference point adoption. In
our next set of analyses, we use the average score on each hole by the entire field
of golfers, rather than par, as the reference point. In Figure 4, we depict how this
rational expectations approach changes our predictions. In Figure 4a, we illustrate
16

Although players hit birdie putts less hard, these shots also have greater left-right variance. As a result, followup putts after a birdie putt are from a similar distance as follow-up putts after a par putt.
17
This can be shown by calculating the angle (using the law of cosines) between the starting and ending position
of the ball relative to the hole—where an angle of zero indicates that the ball ended along the straight line between
the starting position and the hole. Analyses indicate that this angle (left/right mistake) is significantly larger for
birdie putts than for par putts.
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Panel A. Constant reference points
Putt success relative
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Panel B. Reference points based on rational expectations
Putt success relative
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Bogey

Birdie

Eagle

Figure 4
Notes: This figure illustrates the theoretical predictions for putt success for different shot values relative to par,
assuming par as the reference point (panel A) and assuming rational expectations equal to the empirical score on
each hole as the reference point (panel B).

how loss aversion influences putt accuracy if golfers adopt par as the reference point.
In Figure 4b, we illustrate how loss aversion influences putt accuracy if golfers adopt
the average score on each hole (our proxy for rational expectations) as the reference
point.18 We develop predictions for eagle, birdie, par, bogey, and double bogey putts,
but we focus particular attention on the contrast between birdie and par putts.
18

Figure 4 derives from Prospect Theory with no diminishing sensitivity. Depending on the degree of diminishing sensitivity, Figures 4A and 4B would both change in predictable ways. For example, diminishing sensitivity in
the gain domain only (similar to what we find in our results) would cause the following changes to Figure 4B: the
eagle line would shift downward and become concave to the origin to the left of 0 and convex to the origin to the
right of 0, the birdie line would become convex to the origin to the left of zero and would remain under the x-axis
(even at 1) to the right of zero, and the bogey line would grow more steeply as it approached 1.
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If the average score on a hole is the same as par, our predictions in Figure 4 panel
A and panel B are the same. We expect golfers to be less likely to make birdie and
eagle putts than par, bogey, and double bogey putts. In this case, we expect golfers
to be more accurate hitting their par putts than their birdie putts.
If the average score on a hole is one over par (a difficult hole), then golfers who
adopt rational expectations will expect their bogey putt to be the putt that finishes
the hole. In this case, golfers will perceive par, birdie, and eagle putts to be in the
“gain domain,” and we expect golfers to be less accurate hitting these putts than otherwise similar bogey and double bogey putts. In this case, we expect par and birdie
putts to be hit similarly.
Analogously, if the average score on a hole is one under par (an easy hole), then
golfers who adopt rational expectations will expect their birdie putt to be the putt
that finishes the hole. In this case, golfers will perceive only eagle putts to be in the
gain domain, and we expect golfers to hit their eagle putts less accurately than otherwise similar birdie, par, bogey, and double bogey putts. In this case, we expect par
and birdie putts to be hit similarly.
˝ szegi and Rabin (2006) framework is the “V
Our key prediction in testing the K o
shape” pattern depicted in Figure 4 panel B representing the relationship between
the relative accuracy of par and birdie putts. When average scores on a hole are
either one above or one below par, the expectations-as-reference-points model predicts that golfers will hit their par and birdie putts similarly. When average scores
on a hole equal par, the expectations-as-reference-points model predicts that golfers
will hit their par putts more accurately than they hit their birdie putts.
To test these predictions, we divided the data into quintiles according to the difficulty of the hole relative to par. The first quintile includes holes with average scores
much lower than par (very easy holes); the fifth quintile includes holes with average
scores much higher than par (very difficult holes). The variation in hole difficulty,
however, is limited. Compared to par, the average hole scores for the first and fifth
quintiles are −0.30 and 0.33, respectively. The coefficient and standard errors from
a logit regression for each quintile are presented in the Web Appendix and the coefficients are presented in Figure 5.19
Consistent with the expectations-as-reference-points predictions, informed by
˝ szegi and Rabin (2006), we find that the accuracy difference between par and
K o
birdie putts diminishes for difficult holes; the relative accuracy declines from
2.9 percent on moderately difficult holes (holes with average scores equal to par) to
2.3 percent for difficult holes (holes with average scores equal to 0.3 strokes more
than par), p < 0.001. However, the accuracy difference between par and birdie putts
does not diminish for easy holes; the accuracy difference does not decline from
moderately difficult holes (holes with average scores equal to par) to difficult holes
(holes with average scores equal to −0.3 strokes less than par).
The expectations-as-reference-points model predicts that bogey putts will be hit
as accurately as par putts on moderate and easy holes (holes with average scores
equal to or lower than par), but more accurately than par putts on difficult holes
19
For these regressions, we use logit rather than OLS, because logit regression allows the shot value coefficients to vary with distance. This enables the coefficients to reflect more accurately the changes in distance across
quintiles.
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Figure 5
Note: This figure graphs the relative putt accuracy for birdie, eagle, and bogey compared to par for each of five quintiles characterized by the difficulty of the hole relative to par.

(holes with average scores higher than par). Our results do not uniformly support
these predictions, but we do find that bogey putts are hit relatively more accurately
than par putts as hole difficulty increases.
The pattern of results we observe for eagle putts is not consistent with the expectations-as-reference-points predictions. Eagle putts, however, comprise only 1.3 percent of the putts in our data, and within our quintile analyses, the standard errors
of the estimates we plot in Figure 6 are very large. For example, the coefficient
for eagle putts in the fifth quintile, which is inconsistent with the expectations-asreference-points prediction, is only marginally different from par (the expectationsas-reference-points prediction).
By accounting for endogenized reference points derived from rational expectations, we increase the predictive validity of our models. Taken together, our results
offer some support for the expectations-as-reference-points predictions.
G. Heterogeneity in Loss Aversion
We next consider heterogeneity across players. We consider individual differences, and we explore the possibility that the most experienced golfers exhibit less
loss aversion than other players.
For each golfer, we measure the accuracy difference between par and birdie putts.
We measure this effect with the birdie coefficient produced by an OLS model that
uses par as the baseline (see Table 3, column 1).
On average, golfers make their birdie putts 3.6 percentage points less often than
they make otherwise similar par putts. We find, however, substantial variation across
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Panel A. Histogram of birdie coefficients
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Notes: Figure 6A plots a histogram of the relative accuracy of birdie putts compared to par putts using our baseline
specification (column 1 of Table 3) for each of the 421 golfers in our dataset. Figure 6B plots the relative accuracy
of birdie compared to par putts for each golfer by each golfer’s 2007 World Golf Rank.

players. We depict this variation in a histogram in Figure 6 panel A, and we find
that the variation in loss aversion across players is significant (in a chi-squared test,
p < 0.001). Consistent with loss aversion, the large majority of players (94 percent)
have negative point estimates.
Prior work has found that experience can eliminate judgment biases (e.g., List 2003,
2004), and with our data we consider the possibility that expertise mitigates loss aversion. We use each player’s 2007 World Golf Rank as a measure of expertise. In Figure
6 panel B, we present a scatter plot of each golfer’s 2007 World Golf Rank and his
relative accuracy coefficient for birdie. We find no significant relationship between a
golfer’s overall rank and his tendency to miss birdie relative to par putts (p = 0.90).
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Table 7—Understanding the Costs of Missing Birdie Putts
2007
Rank
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
Average

Golfer
Tiger Woods
Vijay Singh
Jim Furyk
Phil Mickelson
K. J. Choi
Rory Sabbatini
Zach Johnson
Charles Howell III
Brandt Snedeker
Adam Scott
Scott Verplank
Steve Stricker
Sergio Garcia
Woody Austin
Hunter Mahan
John Rollins
Boo Weekley
Aaron Baddeley
Ernie Els
Mark Calcavecchia

Tournaments
played
16
27
23
22
25
23
23
26
29
19
23
23
19
27
27
29
29
23
16
28
23.85

Scoring
average
(72 holes)
69.1
70.39
70.21
70.39
70.4
70.49
70.95
71.47
70.5
70.96
70.56
70.19
70.45
70.84
70.78
70.97
70.95
70.96
70.5
71.11
70.6

Tournament
Additional
% earnings
earnings
earnings if scored increase if scored
(2007)
1 stroke better
1 stroke better

$10,867,052
$4,728,376
$4,154,046
$5,819,988
$4,587,859
$4,550,040
$3,922,338
$2,832,091
$2,836,643
$3,413,185
$3,114,289
$4,663,077
$3,721,185
$2,887,596
$2,858,995
$2,488,891
$2,613,211
$3,441,119
$2,705,715
$2,993,332
$3,959,951

$945,532
$584,550
$1,530,232
$659,750
$362,450
$902,567
$347,000
$374,500
$393,650
$221,400
$490,750
$1,077,000
$784,807
$399,066
$339,533
$1,005,300
$883,633
$277,040
$734,633
$504,533
$640,896

8.70
12.36
36.84
11.34
7.90
19.84
8.85
13.22
13.88
6.49
15.76
23.10
21.09
13.82
11.88
40.39
33.81
8.05
27.15
16.86
17.6

Notes: We obtained these data for the top 20 ranked golfers from golf.com. (Golf. 2007. "Back on Track." March
23. http://www.golf.com/golf/tours_news/article/0,28136,1602656,00.html.) Along with their ranks, names, tournaments played, average score, and annual tournament earnings, the table provides the additional earnings each
player would have earned had he increased his score by one stroke per tournament relative to the rest of the golfers.

H. Size of the Effects
To understand the magnitude of the effects we observe, we consider how hitting birdie putts as accurately as otherwise similar par putts would change expected
Tournament winnings. On average, golfers who play all four rounds in our sample
attempt 45.1 birdie putts in each Tournament. Using our most conservative estimates, we calculate that if golfers hit each of their birdie putts as accurately as they
hit otherwise similar par putts, their Tournament score would improve by more than
one stroke per Tournament.
In professional golf, improving a score by one stroke is substantial. In Table 7, for
each of the top 20 golfers in 2007, we list the number of 2007 Tournaments in which
he participated, his average score across these Tournaments, and his Tournament earnings for 2007. On average, the top 20 golfers earned nearly $4 million in Tournament
earnings alone.20 For each player, we created a counterfactual and calculated the additional amount he would have earned had he improved his score by one stroke in each
of the Tournaments in which he participated (assuming that other players’ scores
remained unchanged). On average, these golfers would have earned an additional
$640,000 (17.6 percent). These results offer insight into the importance of our effect,
20
For the top golfers, Tournament earnings are likely to underestimate the total value they receive from doing
well in golf. For example, due mainly to endorsements, Forbes (2006. "Not as Rich as You'd Think." Forbes,
September 18. http://www.forbes.com/2006/09/15/cx_aolarpslide.html) declared Tiger Woods’ net worth to be
$500 million—far more than his approximately $83 million in career Tournament earnings as of the end of 2008.
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but these results should be interpreted with care. Although the top golfers in our dataset would earn substantially more money if they could hit their birdie putts like their
par putts, concentration and effort may be limited resources. Quite possibly, golfers
may be unable to hit all of their putts with equal accuracy.
V. Discussion and Conclusion

Our results demonstrate that loss aversion, a fundamental bias, continues to persist in a highly competitive market. We find that experienced agents systematically
exhibit this bias and that it is not only pervasive, but costly.
In our study, we document loss aversion in professional golf. We analyze detailed
data from the PGA Tour, and we demonstrate that professional golfers hit birdie
putts less accurately than they hit otherwise similar par putts. We consider a number
of competing explanations including differences in position on the green, individual
differences, and learning. We find that none of these explanations can account for
the pattern of results we observe, and we demonstrate that even the very best golfers—including Tiger Woods—exhibit this bias.
Interestingly, the bias we observe is moderated by round. As the Tournament progresses, the accuracy gap between par and birdie putts diminishes but is not extinguished. This finding implies that the accuracy gap derives from a psychological
rather than a mechanical process.
Our findings are consistent with Prospect Theory (Kahneman and Tversky 1979).
Rather than broadly bracketing across the 72 holes in a Tournament, players narrowly bracket and adopt the salient reference point of par within each hole. Although
professional golfers should strive to hit each putt as accurately as possible, golfers
hit birdie putts (in the domain of “gains”) less accurately and less hard than they hit
par putts (in the domain of “losses”).
We also consider and find evidence to suggest that golfers use rational expecta˝ szegi and Rabin 2006). We use average performance
tions to set reference points (K o
˝ szegi and Rabin (2006), we
on holes to gauge hole difficulty, and, consistent with K o
find that the accuracy gap between par and birdie putts diminishes for very difficult
holes and that the gap between par and bogey putts widens for very difficult holes.
Although we find persistent bias among experienced professionals in a highstakes setting, we cannot directly generalize our findings in golf to other domains,
such as financial advising, real estate, and public policy. Our results, however, are
suggestive. If Tiger Woods exhibits loss aversion when he plays golf on the PGA
Tour, judgment biases may be more pervasive than prior research suggests.
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